How much was lost in the Polter Finance hack?

$12M Oracle Exploit, as publicly reported (November 17, 2024).

Polter Finance Hack: $12M Oracle Exploit

Q: How was the Polter Finance hack carried out?

Flash Loan Oracle Manipulation. The attacker took a flash loan to distort the spot price of BOO in the SpookySwap pool Polter used as its oracle. The oracle then valued 1 BOO at roughly $1.37 trillion, inflating the attacker's collateral to a level that let them borrow against phantom value.

November 17, 2024 · Fantom / Ethereum

stolen

$12M

fake BOO valuation

$1.37T

What happened

On November 17, 2024, Polter Finance — a lending protocol on Fantom forked from Geist and Aave — was drained after an attacker used a flash loan to manipulate the spot price of the BOO token in the SpookySwap pool that Polter relied on as its price oracle. The flawed oracle valued a single BOO at roughly $1.37 trillion, letting the attacker borrow against wildly inflated collateral and empty the pools of FTM, USDC, sFTMX and MIM. Reported losses were about $8.7M on-chain and ~$12M per Polter's police report. The team froze the protocol, attempted an on-chain bounty negotiation that went unanswered, and ultimately shut the project down. The proceeds were bridged off Fantom. ChainHint holds no fund-flow trace of its own for this incident: Fantom is not among the chains our tracer supports, and the Ethereum-mainnet graph that used to sit on this row was cleared on 2026-09-16.

How the funds moved

Step 1

Flash Loan Oracle Manipulation

The attacker took a flash loan to distort the spot price of BOO in the SpookySwap pool Polter used as its oracle. The oracle then valued 1 BOO at roughly $1.37 trillion, inflating the attacker's collateral to a level that let them borrow against phantom value.

Step 2

Bridge Off Fantom

Drained assets — FTM, USDC, sFTMX and MIM — were bridged off Fantom to Ethereum.

Step 3

Shutdown After Failed Negotiation

Polter froze the protocol and posted an on-chain bounty offer, which the attacker never answered. With the pools emptied and no recovery path, the team wound the project down.

Key findings

Attacker Address (Ethereum side)

0xedee…9dcfPolter Finance exploiter's mainnet address after bridging proceeds off Fantom — consolidation point for the Ethereum-side flow.

ExploiterCross-chain

Root Cause

Flash-loan oracle manipulation (BOO)Polter priced collateral off a manipulable SpookySwap spot pool. A flash loan pushed the reported BOO price to ~$1.37T, an economic exploit of the oracle design rather than a code-injection bug.

Oracle Manipulation

Destination Pattern

Not established from our dataWhere the bridged assets went after the hop off Fantom is not established here: our tracer does not cover Fantom, and this row carries no graph.

Aftermath

Protocol shut down — funds unrecoveredLosses reported at ~$8.7M on-chain and ~$12M in Polter's police report. An on-chain bounty offer drew no reply; the protocol froze operations and closed.

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