Binance said $6.3 billion. Eight sources gave eight numbers. We read the chain.
Eight public estimates of the 29 October Binance theft, from $5.5B to $6.43B, and what sits between them.

On 29 October 2026 money began leaving Binance's hot wallets at about 20:05 UTC. Within days the theft had at least eight public price tags, from "at least $5.5 billion" to $6.43 billion, plus one range that starts at $3.3 billion.
None of them is wrong in the way people usually mean. They count different things. This page lays the numbers side by side, says what separates them, and then does what none of them publish: reads the attacker's own Ethereum transactions one by one, and checks the Binance–Bitget link hop by hop.
Everything below can be re-checked from the addresses and transaction hashes at the bottom of the page.
1. Eight price tags

| Source | Figure | What it counts |
|---|---|---|
| SourceBinance | Figureabout $6.3B | What it countsThe exchange's own estimate of impact. It later said it had reserved more than $6.34B to cover losses. |
| SourceTRM Labs | Figure$6.36B | What it countsEach transfer priced at the moment it was taken, across ten chains. The same assets were worth about $6.23B at a later price. |
| SourceElliptic | Figure$6.43B | What it countsEleven chains, including NEAR, which TRM does not list. Includes about $174M that the wallet labelled Binance 16 sent with its own key. Excludes $169M that left Binance after withdrawals were suspended and went to long-established addresses. |
| SourceChainalysis (CEO) | Figure$6.4B | What it countsA statement by the company's CEO. |
| SourceChainalysis (media) | Figure$5.9B | What it countsReported by media; the methodology is not published. |
| SourceIndependent trace (HackMD) | Figureabout $5.85B | What it countsOnly the source transfers the author checked: seven chains, at least 15 Binance-labelled addresses. |
| SourceBlockaid | Figureat least $5.5B | What it countsA floor from the transfers confirmed at the time of writing. |
| SourceFireblocks | Figure$3.3B–$6.3B | What it countsA gross-outflow range published the day after. |
Three things move the number, and none of them is an error.
When you price it. TRM's own two figures differ by $130M only because ETH, BTC and the rest moved after the theft.
Which wallets you count. Elliptic counts the Binance 16 transfer; Binance 16 was signed with that wallet's own key, not through the hijacked delegation. Elliptic also leaves out $169M it reads as Binance moving its own money.
How much you have checked. "At least" and "checked" figures are floors that rise as the trace grows. The independent trace covered seven chains; TRM and Elliptic covered ten and eleven.
So when a headline says "$6.3 billion" and another says "$5.9 billion", both can be honest. What they cannot be is compared without the footnote.
2. The operator's evening, transaction by transaction
The Ethereum part of the theft ran through one operator address, 0x7C86…5CA0. It was funded with three small Tornado Cash withdrawals the day before. We read every transaction it sent on 29 October.

13:51–16:47 UTC: rehearsals. The operator signed EIP-7702 delegations for three test wallets of its own (0x8378…FBc3, 0x9C29…bB6B, 0x43AE…04BD), then called them to sweep. At 15:59:11 it deployed the sweeper contract 0x63e8…6fAe.
20:20:59: the delegation. One type-4 transaction to Binance 14 (0x28C6…1d60) carried 50 pre-signed authorizations. Blockaid lists them as one per nonce, from 18,914,775 to 18,914,824.
20:24:23: the big one. One call moved 167,464.25 ETH and 63 token transfers, including 1,615,409,499 USDT, from Binance 14 to 0x5227…2f8c, an address with no earlier history. At block-time prices, the ETH and USDT alone come to about $2.00B.
Twenty-four seconds later, at 20:24:47, a different address, 0xDFd5…963d, sent 28,005.6 ETH to the same place. This matches the 28,006 ETH that Elliptic attributes to Binance 16.
Then six more sweeps. Every call below went from the operator to Binance 14:
| UTC | Moved out of Binance 14 | Transaction |
|---|---|---|
| UTC20:24:23 | Moved out of Binance 14167,464.25 ETH + 63 token transfers, incl. 1,615.4M USDT | Transaction0x53bd38b8…e2f3 |
| UTC20:41:23 | Moved out of Binance 14780,000,000 USDC | Transaction0xdc102dd8…7481 |
| UTC20:59:47 | Moved out of Binance 1443,000,000 USDC | Transaction0x3b9625b3…79ca7 |
| UTC21:04:23 | Moved out of Binance 141,699.92 ETH + 3.9M USDT + 22 other token transfers | Transaction0x31c4c9fe…a91d |
| UTC21:44:11 | Moved out of Binance 14369.83 ETH + 200.4M USDT + 13 other token transfers | Transaction0x55ba4dab…0556 |
| UTC22:39:35 | Moved out of Binance 14128.49 ETH + 122 token transfers | Transaction0x4a4aed83…6b |
| UTC23:36–23:54 | Moved out of Binance 14five calls, nothing moved | Transaction0x50599285…, 0xe016ae73…, 0x83320207…, 0x698dac6c…, 0xac08e569… |
| UTC23:56:47 | Moved out of Binance 142,961.91 ETH | Transaction0x4395d51d…89b |
Two details here are not in the published timelines.
The USDC was frozen four and a half minutes after it landed. The two USDC sweeps add up to exactly 823,000,000. TRM records Circle freezing 823M USDC at 21:04, while the second sweep had arrived at 20:59:47. Every USDC that came out of Binance 14 this way was stopped.
Five empty sweeps. TRM lists follow-up sweeps at 20:41, 20:59, 21:04, 21:44, 22:39 and 23:56. On the chain there are also five calls between 23:36 and 23:54 that succeeded but moved nothing. The operator was still trying the door after the room was empty. Then the 23:56 call took 2,961.91 ETH, which Elliptic describes as new deposits that had landed in Binance 14. The delegation stayed live until Binance cleared it at 00:10 UTC on 30 October.
3. Two feeders, one wallet: checking the Bitget link
On 30 October, ZachXBT reported that funds from this theft and from September's Bitget exploit had been combined at one Ethereum address, 0x1510…feb7, after passing through THORChain. Chainalysis and Elliptic later said the same, and it became a main pillar of the attribution. We wrote about the Bitget incident here, so we checked it.

THORChain's own records show exactly two sources sending swaps into 0x1510…feb7. Together they delivered 387.04 ETH in 15 swaps:
| Source | Delivered | First seen |
|---|---|---|
SourceBitcoin bc1qxtl0…dpp0 | Delivered349.46 ETH (8 swaps) | First seenfirst transaction 23 Oct 09:41 UTC |
SourceTron TDNF7Cwf…8uRA | Delivered37.58 ETH (7 swaps) | First seenfirst swap 30 Oct 03:43 UTC |
The Bitcoin side is the important one. That address started sending BTC into THORChain on 23 October, six days before Binance was hit. It was fed through a collector, bc1qeeld…atq5 (137.5 BTC in, all of it spent), which in turn received 24 transfers of exactly 5.0 BTC from 24 different addresses between 21 and 27 October, plus one 10 BTC transfer at 03:29 UTC on 29 October. All of that is before 20:05 UTC on the 29th.
So the Bitcoin feeder cannot be carrying Binance money. That is a fact about timestamps, not an attribution. The Tron feeder appears only after the theft. Its main source, TQrzMj8e…bxcAD, took in 1.54M TRX and 15.9K USDT between 03:42 and 03:55 UTC on 30 October. THORChain's price limits sent most of that back: of about 1.64M TRX submitted, about 1.44M TRX came back as refunds.
What we did not do is follow those 24 addresses back to Bitget's wallets. That link rests on ZachXBT, Chainalysis and Elliptic. What the chain shows on its own is narrower and firmer: one wallet combined money that was moving before the Binance theft with money that first moved after it.

4. The operator's inbox
Ethereum transactions can carry text. Within an hour of the theft, strangers started writing to the operator address.

At 21:01 UTC someone asked for a donation. At 23:02 a wallet company used the moment to advertise. One address sent the same insult again and again, signed off with "Hyperliquid." and later "Monero.". At 03:55 the next morning someone claiming "auxiliary permissions" offered to "clear all obstacles" in exchange for 1,000 ETH, sent to their own address. A con aimed at a thief.
None of these senders has any visible link to the attack. They are noise, but they are also a reminder: an address that is all over the news becomes a target itself.
5. Someone tried to rob the robber
The commingling address 0x1510…feb7 made eleven real payments on 30 October. Within minutes of most payments, a lookalike address appeared in its history: same first and last characters, plus a fake token transfer for the same amount, usually a token named "ETH".

Across the address we count 39 fake "ETH" transfer events from 11 token contracts, 22 lookalike addresses and 15 zero-value "touches". Ten of the fake transfers use a token whose name only looks like ETH: a Cyrillic Е, a Greek Τ and a Cyrillic Н, with invisible characters in between.
This is address poisoning, the same trick used against ordinary users every day. It did not work here: none of the eleven real payments went to a lookalike (as of 14 November).
What this page does not claim
- We do not attribute the theft to anyone. The FBI attributed it to TraderTraitor; TRM, Chainalysis and Elliptic reached similar conclusions. That is their finding, cited, not ours.
- We do not say any estimate in section 1 is wrong. We say what each one counts.
- We do not claim the five-bitcoin addresses belong to the Bitget attacker. We show they predate the Binance theft.
- We say nothing about who sent the messages or the poisoning transfers.
Method and limits
- Ethereum transactions, token transfers and internal transfers come from Blockscout. Bitcoin data comes from mempool.space, Tron from TronGrid, and THORChain swaps and refunds from Midgard.
- USD values in section 2 cover only ETH, USDT and USDC, priced at block time with DefiLlama historical prices. The 60+ other tokens are listed but not priced.
- All times are block times, in UTC.
- The data was read on 14 November 2026. Balances and labels change, so re-run it before quoting.
Addresses and transactions
Ethereum
- Operator: 0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0
- Binance 14: 0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60
- Sweeper contract: 0x63e842B054Bd624a465454D533C33F573e9c6fAe
- Main receiving address: 0x5227f603C1eE34CE3C06eFe6477003BDfCCB2f8c
- Late-sweep receiver: 0xA97bF7836F8A08F9Ed91D41453D371493FAE8d10
- Sender matching Binance 16: 0xDFd5293D8e347dFe59E90eFd55b2956a1343963d
- Commingling address: 0x15104a9ce0f08a8f0075a0869ae80e795fe0feb7
- Test wallets: 0x837810E3Be7a3E89C570E7A01A13d3B566aaFBc3, 0x9C29BA2DE4b2d6c3630685650663cFE7B70dbB6B, 0x43AEdb9BAD6219677a2C8D6858321C16988404BD
- Delegation transaction (20:20:59): 0xad99264d…298b
- Main sweep (20:24:23): 0x53bd38b8…e2f3
- Binance 16 transfer (20:24:47): 0x51f263fa…d39f
- USDC sweeps: 0xdc102dd8…7481, 0x3b9625b3…79ca7
- Last sweep (23:56:47): 0x4395d51d…f89b
Bitcoin
- Feeder: bc1qxtl05lnr7jewlcg95yjq8k8llenyhsem0hdpp0; first transaction f4fca199…fb86
- Collector: bc1qeeld470e89fuuqtce7wc2jy457z8e8nr82atq5
Tron
- Feeder: TDNF7CwfcKvgtaRPrMg4isijtf73kr8uRA
- Its main source: TQrzMj8eKRAhizejiejaQVjiL95XsbxcAD
Sources
- Binance, security incident report, Binance Square
- TRM Labs, "North Korea Steals USD 6.36 Billion From Binance in the Largest Hack in History"
- Elliptic, "Binance: the largest hack in history"
- ZachXBT on X, 30 October 2026, commingling address
- Chainalysis CEO statement and media reports, via Coin Edition and Cryptoticker
- Fireblocks, via Blockchain.news; Blockaid, via Odaily; independent trace on HackMD (@kethcode)